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completion of maintenance of transportation structures without first
obtaining a permit. Precedent demonstrated the narrow construction
of this exemption with the apparent purpose of allowing routine government maintenance of transportation, public water-supply, and similar facilities without the cost, use of time, and consequent danger to
people and facilities that may occur if a permit was required. The
court concluded the Town's actions fell within the maintenance exemption, construing an embankment that supported a road for transit
by motor vehicles as a "transportation structure." The court further
noted that "maintenance," under this exemption, did not include any
modification that changed the character, scope, or size of the original
fill design. However, the court did not rule on this issue since June did
not raise it or discuss the federal regulation supporting it either in the
district court or on appeal. The court, thus, affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment on June's CWA claims because
June only challenged whether the Town qualified for the maintenance
exemption, and the court found that it did.
Finally, in regards to the RCRA claim that the Town engaged in the
dumping of solid waste, the court also granted summary judgment in
favor of the Town. The court relied on S. Rd. Assocs. v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc. to conclude the RCRA prohibited the act of introducing
substances that caused "exceedances," but did not prohibit the actual
pollution of the toxic substance in the environment. The court also
determined a "historical act" did not support a claim under the RCRA.
The court held June's allegations were "historical acts," as he failed to
show the Town was continuing to introduce substances that made the
exceedances worse at the time June filed his lawsuit.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Town on all issues.
Michael O'Loughlin
SIXTH CIRCUIT
Ailor v. City of Maynardville, 368 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding
that a citizen suit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
and the Clean Water Act is moot if previous enforcement actions
remedied the alleged injuries).
The City of Maynardville ("City") owned and operated a sewage
treatment plant on Bull Run Creek in Tennessee.
Betty Lynch
("Lynch") and Harry Ailor ("Ailor") both owned land along the creek
downstream from the plant. Between January 1991 and December
1992, the plant repeatedly violated its National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") permit due to overflows and discharges
of raw sewage and other pollutants into Bull Run Creek, inducing the
Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation ("TDEC") to
issue an Order and Assessment in November 1993 against the City.
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The Tennessee Water Quality Control Board entered an Agreed Order
("Order") in July 1995 that included civil penalties and required the
City to develop and implement a corrective action plan to bring the
plant into compliance with its NPDES permit. The City met its requirements and opened the expanded and improved treatment plant
in November 2000 with a final inspection in February 2001. Since the
inspection, the plant had no major violations of its NPDES permit and
only four minor violations.
Lynch and Ailor filed a citizen suit in state court in January 1998
and gave notice to the City of a pending suit in February 2001. They
filed a citizen suit again in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee in May 2001 under the Clean Water Act
("CWA") and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")
alleging that the plant's overflows and discharges caused serious bodily
injury and loss of value to their property. Lynch and Ailor sought remedial relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and litigation
costs. The district court granted summary judgment to the City, stating
that although the TDEC enforcement action did not preclude the citizen suit under the CWA, the previous enforcement action already
granted all forms of relief available to Lynch and Ailor under RCRA
and the CWA. Lynch and Ailor filed a motion to alter or amend judgment based on the City's admission that it violated its NPDES permit
several times after November 2000. The district court summarily denied the motion for failure to show good cause. Lynch and Ailor filed
this appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
claiming that the City did not meet the burden required to establish
mootness and that their RCRA claim was improperly dismissed.
The court reviewed the district court's grant of summary judgment
de novo to determine whether Lynch and Ailor had standing. The
court stated that standing requires a plaintiff to demonstrate: 1) he or
she suffered an "injury in fact" that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; 2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's
challenged action; and 3) the injury can be redressed by a favorable
decision. The court determined that Ailor did not possess standing,
since he no longer owned the property in question and, therefore, had
no redressable injury in fact because the CWA does not allow citizen
suits for past violations. However, the court found that Lynch possessed standing, because of classifying the four minor discharges by the
City's plant as continuing violations.
Lynch and Ailor then argued that the district court erred in granting the City's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that their
CWA claims were moot. A citizen suit, under the CWA, requires a
showing of continuous violation with a reasonable likelihood that there
will be more violations in the future. A citizen suit is also only proper
when the federal, state, and local agencies failed to enforce the laws.
Since the TDEC initiated enforcement proceedings and the City fixed
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the plant according to the Order issued, the court found that there
must be a good-faith allegation of continuous or intermittent violation
for the suit to be proper. The burden is on the City to show that the
alleged violations were not likely to recur. The court found that the
City satisfied their burden, because the minor violations occurred before the replacement of the outdated plant.
Lynch and Ailor also argued that the district court erred in dismissing their RCRA claim. The court upheld-the district court's ruling that
the case was moot. The court reasoned that the City's actions after the
filing of the lawsuit remedied the injuries alleged in the complaint with
no showing of a reasonable likelihood of recurrence. Additionally, the
court upheld the district court's dismissal of Lynch and Ailor's RCRA
claim based on the fact that the relief available under RCRA is no different than the relief available under the CWA.
Conversely, the dissent argued the City did not satisfy its burden to
show that alleged violations would not recur. Since the plant's last violation was only six months before the district court granted summary
judgment, the dissent asserted that this was not enough time to show a
reasonable likelihood that the discharges and overflows would not recur, especially with the possibility of higher flows in winter and spring.
The dissent also stated the state's determination that the City substantially complied with its obligations should not shield the City from citizen suits seeking to enforce the CWA.
For the reasons above, the court affirmed the district court's holding that Lynch and Ailor's suit was moot and that relief is not available
under RCRA or the CWA when the previous actions already remedied
the alleged injuries.
Kathleen Booth
NINTH CIRCUIT
Save Our Sonoran v. Flowers, 381 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding:
(1) a district court's grant of a preliminary injunction suspending construction activities is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion where the
reasons for granting the injunction are firmly based in the factual record of the case; and (2) that an organization challenging an action
based on National Environmental Policy Act noncompliance has
standing as long as the organization's injury in fact results from the
alleged noncompliance).
56th & Lone Mountain, L.L.C. ("Lone Mountain") appealed to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona granting a preliminary injunction
against any construction activity on a planned housing development
located on 608 acres of undisturbed land in the Sonoran Desert. The
district court granted the injunction pending the outcome of a suit
brought by a nonprofit organization, Save Our Sonoran ("SOS"),

